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4. OccupatiOnal labOur markets
4.1 Teacher salaries, teachers’ selection and turnover
Júlia Varga
Becoming a teacher is not a result of a single decision, but of a series of sub-
sequent ones. Prospective teachers first have to choose teacher training as a 
field specialization in their higher education studies, and then, after gradu-
ating (or later) they have to decide on entering the teaching profession and 
continuing therein. The composition of teachers is the result of this series of 
self-selection processes.
How do wages affect a teacher’s decision to enter and remain in the teach-
ing role? Can teacher attrition be reduced by means of wage increases? How 
does an overall wage increase affects teacher attrition for different groups of 
teachers? The answer to these questions is of central policy importance. As 
teachers constitute a large proportion of public servants and as the salary costs 
of teachers, and other school employees make up around 80 per cent of cur-
rent educational expenditures a wage increase for teachers also has importance 
from a budgetary respect. This chapter investigates how teachers’ salaries af-
fect the composition of teachers, more specifically, how the 2002 year public 
servants’ wage increase effected attrition of the different groups of teachers.
Earlier research has found that teacher salaries have an effect on who choos-
es the teaching profession (Dolton, 1990, Chevalier et al., 2002, Wolter and 
Denzler, 2003). For Hungary Varga (2007) found that the decisive factor in 
the choice of the teaching profession is the difference of attainable earnings 
between non-teaching and teaching jobs. The same study also found that 
there are self-selection processes at every point in the process of becoming 
a teacher – applying for teacher training, finding employment as a teacher 
after finishing higher education, and continuing teaching in the fifth and 
sixth years after qualifying. Those who apply for college-level teacher train-
ing have less advanced abilities than those who apply for other specialisa-
tions. The less talented graduates are more likely to take teaching jobs, and 
they are more likely to be found among those in their fifth or sixth year of 
a teaching career.
Nevertheless concerning the role of the attractiveness of higher-paying al-
ternative occupations in teacher attrition research findings are mixed. A part 
of the studies found that there is a connection between teacher attrition and 
teachers’ relative wages. Murnane and Olsen (1989) show that higher wages 
have an important influence on how long teachers stay in teaching. Simi-
lar results were presented by Podgursky et al. (2004); Imazeki (2005); Krieg 
(2006); Ondrich et al. (2008); Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995), (1999); and 
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Chevalier et al. (2002). Other studies found that very few teachers who leave 
teaching take jobs that pay more than their prior salaries as teachers. Scafidi 
et al. (2006); Frijters et al, (2004); and Vandenberghe (2000) found that a 
large share of teachers who leave teaching relinquish employment entirely 
or earn less pay in other occupations within the public sector. Other studies 
show that working conditions are as important in teachers’ leaving decisions 
as relative salaries (Hanushek et al. (2001). Stinebrickner (1998) found that 
the role of family circumstances, such as maternity and marriage is decisive 
in teachers’ leaving decisions. Gilpin (2011) found that the wage differential 
between a teaching and a non-teaching occupation matters only for inexpe-
rienced teachers – teachers with less than six years of teaching experience – 
while the work environment affects the leaving decisions of both experienced 
and inexperienced teachers.
This chapter is based on a study which investigated the role of wages in 
teacher attrition in Hungary; the differences in the effect of wages between 
differently aged teachers and the effect of the 2002 year salary increase on 
teacher attrition (Varga, 2013).
Data
The base data-set used in the study was a merged dataset collecting infor-
mation from the Pension Directorate (ONYF), the Health Insurance Fund 
(OEP), the Treasury (MÁK) and the Public Employment Service (ÁFSZ). 
The sample was created by a fifty per cent random draw from the Hungar-
ian population aged 5–74 in January 2002. Each individual in the sample 
is followed from January 2002 until December 2008 or exit from the social 
security system (for reasons of death or permanent emigration). Out of the 
base dataset a “teacher” subsample was created. All individuals who were in 
a teaching job for at least one month between January 2002 and December 
2008 were included in the teacher subsample. We have data for 57,546 indi-
viduals. The unit of observation is the monthly status of individuals and the 
maximum number of observations for an individual is 84 months.
Our data contains information on demographics (age, gender), education-
al attainment (for those with at least one unemployment spell), employment 
status, occupation code, wages for the occupation codes, and transfer receipt.
Methods
For analysing, the effect of the 2002 wage increase on teacher decision to 
leave the profession duration models were used. Duration models estimate 
the conditional probability that a teacher leaves the profession given that she/
he has not left it prior to the month of investigation.
First, we used binary choice Cox proportional hazard models (leaving the 
teaching profession or not), then competing risk models1 that distinguish exits 
1 In the Cox model the base 
hazard is non-parametric, no 
form is pre-specified for the 
baseline hazard, the hazards 
are proportional to each other, 
and do not depend on time, 
but time-dependent covari-
ates also can be incorporated 
to the analysis. Censored data 
are handled in the Cox model: 
both left truncated data, that 
for those who work as teachers 
in the first observation there is 
no information as to how long 
have they worked as a teacher 
and the model also handles the 
right censored data, that we only 
know that the event of interest 
had not happened for an indi-
vidual during the time that was 
the subject of the study, but we 
do not have information if it 
happened later.
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to another occupation and exits to a non-working state. In the Cox-model, the 
risk given covariates are the product of the baseline hazard and a relative risk:
λ[t, x(t)] = λ0(t)ex(t)’В(t),
Where λ0 stands for the base hazard; t for time; x for the observable charac-
teristics of the individual. The Cox-model can allow for time-varying covari-
ates x(t). The model also handles time-dependent effects, where the coeffi-
cients are a parametric function of time β(t), so the effects of covariates are 
not proportional.
A number of those who leave teaching do not go on to another job, but in-
tentionally or non-intentionally arrive at a non-employment state: become 
inactive, go on to child-care pension, retire, become unemployed, etc. As the 
determinants of these decisions might be different from the determinants of 
going to a non-teaching job teacher attrition was also analysed with the help 
of a competing risk model (Fine and Gray, 1999) which distinguishes exits 
to a non-teaching job (NT), and exits out of active status (NF). Competing 
risks are present when those who are working as teachers are at risk of more 
than one mutually exclusive event, and the occurrence of one of these will 
prevent any other event from happening. In our case the individual either 
goes on to a non-teaching job or becomes inactive or unemployed. Compet-
ing risk models define a separate hazard function for each event: going to a 
non-teaching job λNT(t) and becoming inactive or unemployed λNF(t). The total 
hazard of leaving teaching is the sum of the sub-hazards.
The effect of the single, high level wage increase of public servants was an-
alysed with the help of models where the independent variables contained 
dummy variables which indicated the year of the observation using 2002, on 
the one hand, as the reference category. On the other hand as the Cox-model 
makes it possible to split the data by episodes and check whether the effect 
of the covariates differs by episodes this method was used as well. The effect 
of the wage increase was also investigated using episode splitting. The public 
servants’ wage increase came into force in September 2002. The data from 
January to August 2002 describe the state before the wage increase and the 
data from September 2002 the state after the wage increase. Thus, the data 
were split into two episodes and checked to determine if the effect of given 
covariates differed before and after September 2002
Independent variables in the analysis were: gender, age-group dummies in 
the models that used the whole sample, and region of residence. Regional effect 
may reflect different effects: the differences in local labour markets, differences 
in the work environment, and differences in the quality of education caused 
by, for instance, differences in pupils’ composition or other factors. Further 
independent variables in the models were if the individual had worked as a 
teacher in primary or secondary education. The effect of wages was measured 
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by the (log) wages of the individual at January 2002 constant prices.2 In ad-
dition, the monthly unemployment rate of the region of the individual’s res-
idence was also included. Finally, a dummy variable indicated if the month 
was September. School years begin in September and prior to that there is a 
long summer holiday, so it might be worthwhile to delay an exit from teach-
ing until September and use the full the summer holiday.
Teacher attrition
Figure 4.1.1 shows the empirical Kaplan and Meier survival functions by gen-
der and age-group.3 The figure shows in the months observed the proportion 
of teachers who are still working as teachers. The figure for the whole sample 
shows that for those teachers who began teaching between January 2002 and 
December 2008 the unconditional exit rate was quite steady between 2002 
and 2008. Exit rates of men and women were similar between January 2002 
and September 2002, but thereafter the exit rates of men were higher than 
the exit rates of women.
Figure 4.1.1: Kaplan–Meier empirical survival (remaining in the teaching profession) functions  
by gender and age-groups
There are marked differences after September 2002. Only half of the teach-
ers who were younger than 30 years of age and older than 51–60 remained in 
teaching by December 2008. Survival was the greatest among teachers who 
were 41–51 years of age. Exit rates of the younger and older teachers were 
slightly higher by January 2008 than for middle-aged teachers, but thereafter 
2 We estimated also three fur-
ther specifications using dif-
ferent measures for teachers’ 
relative wages. The detailed 
estimations results are reported 
in Varga (2013).
3 Censored cases are not re-
garded as exits.
in focus
184
exit rates of the younger and older teachers accelerated. The smallest survival 
can be observed among young teachers.
How much do teachers earn after leaving the profession?
Table 4.1.1 shows average monthly earnings of current and former teachers 
one month after former teachers had left teaching at constant prices. Aver-
age earnings of former teachers are smaller one month after leaving teaching 
than the average earnings of those who remain in teaching posts because a 
large proportion of former teachers become inactive, go on to childcare pen-
sion or retire. Average earnings of former teachers who remain active and are 
working in a non-teaching job is higher than earnings of current teachers
Table 4.1.1: Average monthly earnings of current and former teachers  
(in constant prices – 2002 January, HUF)
All –30  years old
31–40 
years old
41–50 
years old
51–60 
years old
61–  
years old
Current teachers 149,818 106,531 130,229 169,783 192,820 159,807
All former teachers 123,480 84,294 104,286 151,043 172,909 107,529
Former teachers who remain 
working 152,031 113,220 138,516 170,804 181,320 104,384
Former teachers who are on 
child-care pension 47,348 47,030 46,858 37,013 – –
Former teachers who are non-
employed for other reasons 48,977 49,931 46,900 39.003 39,4712 43,890
There are differences by age groups. Inexperienced, young, former teachers, 
those who are younger than 30 and those who are 31–40 years of age earn 
more on average than those who remain in teaching. Average earning gain of 
former teachers is not too high at 6–7 per cent. Older teachers do not achieve 
any earnings gain from attrition. There is no difference between the earnings 
of former and current teachers for those who are 41–50 years of age. Earnings 
of former teachers who are older than 50 are even lower than the earnings of 
their counterparts who remain in teaching.
The effect of salaries and the effect of the public servants’ wage 
increase
In September 2002 the base salary of public servants was increased uniformly 
by 50 per cent and, as a consequence, average real salaries of teachers increased 
by 20.5 per cent. Nevertheless in the subsequent years the wage increase of 
teachers slowed down, and then stopped, and the relative earnings of teachers 
began to deteriorate. (See “Teacher salaries in the public sector”; in Box 4.1.1).
Table 4.1.2 reports the results of the binary choice Cox-model split for two 
episodes. The table shows the sub-hazard rates. The first part of the table re-
ports the results of the base model. The second part of the table shows the 
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results of the estimations where the variables in the equation were split into 
two episodes (months 0–9 and months 10–84), to check if there was a differ-
ence in the probability of attrition before and after the public servants’ wage 
increase. That is, it was checked to see if the probability of attrition differed 
during the first eight months of the observations and during the subsequent 
months for teachers with certain characteristics (belonging to different age-
groups; teachers teaching in secondary education as compared to teachers 
teaching in primary schools; male teachers as compared to female teachers). 
A hazard ratio greater than one implies an increased probability of attrition 
while a ratio less than one implies a decreased probability.4
Table 4.1.2: Binary choice Cox proportional hazard models  
(leaving teaching profession or not) split to episodes
4 For instance in the base model 
the hazard ratio of men is 1.142 
indicating that the probability 
of leaving for men is 14.2 per 
cent higher than for women. 
Similarly a one percentage 
point increase in the regional 
unemployment rate wil l de-
crease attrition by 7.4 per cent 
(the hazard rate is 0.926).
Hazard rate
Base model
Gender (Male) 1.142***
Teaching in secondary school 1.043*
Monthly unemployment rate in the region 0.926***
(log) real salary 0.693***
September 0.096***
–30 years old 2.282***
31–40 years old 1.599***
51–60 years old 3.373***
Older than 60 years 12.438***
tvc (variables in tvc equation interacted with t < 9)
Gender (Male) 1.219**
Teaching in secondary school 1.219**
–30 years old 1.255***
31–40 years old n. s.
51–60 years old 0.433***
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. * Sig-
nificant at the 10 per cent level. n.s. not significant.
Other controls: Regions Reference category: Female, teaching in primary or 
lower secondary education, region Southern Transdanubia, another month 
than September, 41–50 years old.
Results of the base model show that the lower the salary of the teacher the 
higher the probability of attrition. Teachers who are younger than 30 leave 
the profession with more than twice the probability as that of teachers who 
are 41–50 years of age. Teachers who are 41–50 years of age remain in teach-
ing with the highest probability compared to the other age groups. The high 
probability of attrition for the 51–60 years of age group and teachers who are 
older than 60 is due to retirement.
The results of the interactions with duration show that the effect of gender 
is different in months 0–9 and 10–84. The estimate shows a 21.9 per cent 
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larger effect in the second, post wage increase period for men and a 21.9 per 
cent larger effect for teachers teaching in secondary schools. There is no evi-
dence that the effect is different for the 31–40 year old teachers in the two 
periods. Young, inexperienced teachers left teaching with 25.5 per cent larger 
probability after September 2002 than before compared to teachers belong-
ing to the reference group – those in the 41–50 years of age group. The prob-
ability of attrition of older, 51–60 years of age teachers decreased by 56 per 
cent after the wage increase.
Table 4.1.3 summarizes the results of the separate competing risk models 
for age-groups that analysed the effect of the 2002 year wage increase with 
the help of dummy variables which indicated in which year was the month 
under observation. The reference year was 2002. The competing risk models 
which consider the effect of wages on multiple causes of attrition were going 
to a non-teaching job and becoming inactive or unemployed.
Table 4.1.3: The effect of wage increase – Competing risk models (subhazard rates).  
Risks: Working in a non-teaching job/ Inactive or unemployed
–30 years old 31–40 years old 41–50 years old 51–60 years old
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Working in 
non-teaching 
job
Inactive or 
unemployed
Gender (Male) 1.511*** 0.700*** 2.031*** 0.397*** 1.707*** n. s. 1.241*** 0.734***
Log real salaries 0.745*** 0.670*** 0.847*** 0.660*** 0.597*** 0.464*** 0.773*** 0.788***
2003 0.777** n. s. 0.760** n. s. 0.561*** 1.674*** 0.920 0.864
2004 n. s. 2.355*** n. s. n. s. 0.594*** 1.769*** 0.711*** 0.682***
2005 n. s. 3.739*** n. s. 1.736*** 0.591*** 2.171*** 0.676*** 0.595***
2006 n. s. 3.581*** n. s. 1.884*** 0.728** 2.256*** 0.681*** 0.234***
2007 1.667*** 7.157*** 1.518*** 6.791*** n. s. 5.271*** n. s. 0.182***
2008 1.392*** 8.258*** 10.060*** n. s. 4.532*** n. s. 0.229***
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Significant at the 5 per cent level. * Significant 
at the 10 per cent level. n.s. Not significant.
Other control variables in the model: teaching in secondary school, monthly unem-
ployment rate in the region, September.
Reference category: female, teaching in primary school, region Southern Transdanu-
bia, another month than September, year 2002.
Low salaries increase the probability of moving to another job or becom-
ing inactive. As for the effect of the public servants’ wage increase: in 2003 
young teachers (younger than 30), and those teachers in the 31–40 years of 
age group left teaching for a non-teaching job with a lower probability than 
in 2002. The results show no difference in the probability of attrition after 
2004, compared to 2002. After 2007 young teachers left teaching with a great-
er probability than in 2002. The probability of becoming inactive increased 
after 2004 both for teachers under 30 and teachers between 31–40 years of 
age. Teachers who are younger than 30 became, with twice as much prob-
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ability, inactive or unemployed in 2004 than in 2002, and with an eightfold 
larger probability in 2008. For the 31–40-year-old teachers, the probability 
of becoming unemployed is tenfold greater in 2008 than in 2002.
The effect of the wage increase lasted longer for older teachers and was 
stronger than for the young. The probability of going to a non-teaching job 
decreased for older teachers after the wage increase. Both the 41–50 year old 
teachers and the 51–60 year old teachers exited teaching for another job with 
lower probability from 2003 to 2006 than in 2002. The effect was the strong-
est for the 41–50 year old teachers. They exited teaching with a 40–45 per 
cent smaller probability than in 2002. The probability of becoming inactive 
had been decreasing for the 41–50 year old teachers from 2003. The older, 
51–60 year old teachers had become inactive with a much lower probability 
after 2002 than in 2002.
The public sector wage increase had reduced the probability of going to a 
non-teaching job for young teachers only for one year. The effect lasted long-
er for older teachers. After the wage increase young teachers for some years 
went to another job and became inactive with larger probability than before 
the wage increase. On the contrary, older, 51–60 year old teachers had not 
only gone to another job with smaller probability, but they had also become 
inactive with a smaller probability after the wage increase. Older teachers 
were the group of teachers that were retained in teaching by the wage increase.
Where do teachers work after having left the profession?
To get a fuller picture of the determinants of teachers attrition it is worth-
while to summarize where teachers work after having left teaching. Accord-
ing to the results of earlier research (Gilpin, 2011) a large part of the teach-
ers who leave teaching stay in the education sector in an administrative or 
non-teaching job. Our data contains information on the occupation codes 
of former teachers, and it is also possible from the data to identify the sector 
of employment of former teachers. Table 4.1.4 shows by age-group if former 
teachers are working in the education sector or outside the education sector. 
Table 4.1.5 shows the distribution of former teachers who are working out-
side the education sector by occupation group.
The majority of teachers who leave teaching remain in the education sector 
in Hungary too, but there are large differences between age-groups. More than 
70 per cent of former teachers who are younger than 30 years of age leave the 
education sector and more than half of the 31–40 year old group who exit 
teaching go to work outside the education sector. On the contrary more than 
60 per cent of older teachers remain in the education sector in non-teaching 
jobs. That is older teachers leave teaching for other possibilities within the 
education sector – administrative or management jobs. Only one-third of 
former teachers who are older than 41 find a job outside the education sector.
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Table 4.1.4: Distribution of former teachers  
by sector of employment after attrition (per cent)
Whole  
sample
–30  
years old
31–40  
years old
41–50  
years old
51–60  
years old
Working outside the education sector 
in non-teaching job 51.77 70.57 51.24 37.52 39.89
Working in the education sector in 
non-teaching job 48.23 29.43 48.76 62.48 60.11
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 4.1.5: Distribution of former teachers who left education sector  
by occupation group (per cent)
Whole 
sample
–30  
years old
31–40  
years old
41–50  
years old
51–60  
years old
Managers 33.1 11.6 32.0 50.6 47.9
Other professionals 29.7 31.9 32.3 25.5 28.6
Clerical support workers 29.9 43.9 25.4 15.8 17.1
Service and sales workers 3.9 7.9 5.5 3.7 1.1
Elementary occupations 3.4 4.7 4.8 4.4 5.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The table indicates that inexperienced former teachers who exited the educa-
tion sector work not only in other professional jobs, but they also go to oth-
er employment for higher earnings. 44 per cent of former teachers who are 
younger than 30 years of age work as office or administrative support and 
about 8 per cent as service and sales workers. The majority of 31–40 year old 
former teachers work as managers or professionals, a quarter of them become 
clerical support workers, and 5 per cent of them go to service and sales jobs. 
More than half of the former teachers who are older than 41 become man-
agers, a quarter of them go to other professional jobs, and 16–17 per cent 
of them obtain employment as clerical support. About 5 per cent of former 
teachers work in elementary occupations in all age groups of former teachers.
Conclusions
This chapter investigated the effect of salaries on teachers attrition. Results 
show that earnings matter. The lower the salary of a teacher the larger is the 
probability that the teacher will go to another job or becomes inactive in all 
age-groups of teachers, but the effect is stronger for young teachers. The ma-
jority of exiting young teachers leave the education sector and find a job out-
side the education sector. Teachers aged 41–50 remain in teaching with the 
highest probability, all other age groups find another job or become inactive 
with a larger probability. The public sector wage increase in 2002 did reduce 
attrition rates of young teachers’ temporarily, but the effect disappeared as 
the relative earnings of young teachers began to deteriorate again thereafter. 
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Attrition rates of young teachers who are younger than 30 or the 31–40 year 
old group returned to the level where it had been before the salary increase 
or even worsened. Attrition rates of older teachers decreased after Septem-
ber 2002. In 2013, the so-called “teacher career model” was introduced in 
Hungary, and the base salary of teachers was increased in certain parts of the 
pay scale. At the same time, a number of earlier bonuses and supplements 
were abolished. So, we do not know yet if the total salary of teachers or cer-
tain groups of teachers has increased or decreased and how relative salaries 
of teachers have changed. Further analysis will be needed, when micro-level 
data on teacher salaries for 2013 and for the subsequent years will be availa-
ble, to evaluate how the new conditioning of teacher salaries has affected the 
relative wages of teachers and the attractiveness of the teaching profession.
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